Trump touts Gaza deal, Hamas seeks Israeli exit
Long-form analytical articleGaza Peace Framework: Will Hamas disarm first, or will Israel withdraw its forces first?
What actually happened, and why is this in the news?
U.S. President Donald Trump has claimed that the Board of Peace, created to oversee the Gaza ceasefire, has secured a “historic agreement” on the complete disarmament of Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups.
Under the framework presented by Trump, Hamas and other armed groups would surrender their weapons, Israeli forces would withdraw from Gaza, and during the transition an International Stabilization Force and a new Palestinian police would maintain law and order. A new Palestinian administration would then govern Gaza.
However, Hamas’s response made it clear that there is still no complete agreement on implementation. Hamas said that it may be prepared to surrender its weapons and end its rule in Gaza, but only after Israeli forces withdraw from the territory and the killing of Palestinians stops.
Israel’s position is the reverse. Israel wants Hamas’s disarmament to be completed in a real and verifiable manner before the withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Forces proceeds. Meanwhile, another Palestinian armed organisation, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, has described reports about the agreement as inaccurate.
Therefore, this is not the story of a final and fully implemented peace treaty. It concerns a proposed political-security framework in which the parties may be discussing broad objectives, but still disagree about who should take the first and riskiest step.
What is the central argument of the news?
The central argument is that the greatest difficulty in the Gaza peace process is not merely stopping the war; it is the problem of trust and sequencing.
Hamas fears that if it gives up its weapons first, it will lose all leverage to ensure an Israeli withdrawal. Israel, on the other hand, fears that if it withdraws its troops first while Hamas retains weapons, tunnels and a command network, Gaza may again become a base for attacks.
Thus, both sides may accept that disarmament and withdrawal are necessary, but neither wants to become vulnerable first.
For UPSC, this issue is useful under GS Paper II for West Asia, international mediation, conflict resolution, peacekeeping and post-conflict governance. It may also be used in Essay themes such as “Peace without trust”, “Security versus self-determination” and “Why ceasefires fail”.
Background required to understand the Gaza dispute
Why do Hamas and Israel distrust each other’s guarantees so deeply? To understand this, it is necessary to examine Gaza’s geography, its political authority and the developments that followed 2005.
The Gaza Strip is a narrow Palestinian territory on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. The Mediterranean lies to its west, Israel to its north and east, and Egypt to its south-west. The Rafah crossing on the Gaza-Egypt border is an important route for the movement of civilians, patients and humanitarian supplies.
Gaza and the West Bank are both Palestinian territories, but they are not geographically connected. The West Bank lies between Israel and Jordan, whereas Gaza is located on the Mediterranean coast.
This geographical separation is accompanied by political division. Hamas controls Gaza, while the administrative influence of the Palestinian Authority—PA—is largely confined to parts of the West Bank.
Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist political and armed organisation. It established political and military control over Gaza in 2007. A long-standing political rivalry also exists between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.
Consequently, whenever a peace proposal speaks of a “new Palestinian government”, it becomes necessary to clarify who will be part of that government. Will the Palestinian Authority return to Gaza? Will local representatives from Gaza be included? Will political members of Hamas have any role? Or will the administration function under the supervision of external actors?
The Gaza conflict is therefore not only a military confrontation between Israel and Hamas. It is also a question of Palestinian representation and governance.
Why did the dispute continue even after Israel’s 2005 withdrawal?
In 2005, Israel removed its permanent settlements and ground forces from inside Gaza. However, Israeli control or restrictions continued over Gaza’s airspace, maritime access and most external movement.
The two sides therefore do not understand “Israeli withdrawal” in the same way. Israel may define withdrawal as the removal of troops and settlements, while from a Palestinian perspective, external control over border movement, sea access, airspace and the flow of goods also remains significant.
After Hamas established control over Gaza in 2007, Israel and Egypt tightened border restrictions. Israel argued that these restrictions were necessary to prevent the movement of weapons, fighters and military equipment. Palestinians and humanitarian organisations, however, argued that the restrictions severely affected trade, healthcare, employment and ordinary civilian life.
Several rounds of conflict followed. Hamas and other armed groups launched rockets and attacks, while Israel conducted air strikes and military operations.
The Hamas attack of October 2023 and the large-scale Israeli military campaign that followed made the conflict extraordinarily destructive. As a result, current negotiations cannot be confined to stopping fire. They must answer four inter-connected questions:
- What will happen to Hamas’s weapons and military network?
- When, and to what extent, will Israeli forces withdraw?
- Who will manage security in Gaza after both sides step back?
- Who will exercise legitimate political authority over Gaza?
This is where the difference between a ceasefire and a permanent peace settlement becomes clear.
What is the difference between a ceasefire and a peace agreement?
A ceasefire means that the parties stop fighting. It may provide relief to civilians, allow humanitarian aid to enter and create time for negotiations.
However, a ceasefire does not automatically resolve the political and security causes of the conflict.
A peace agreement, by contrast, is a broader settlement. It contains arrangements relating to weapons, troops, territory, prisoners, governance, reconstruction and future security guarantees.
For example, Hamas may stop launching rockets and Israel may stop bombardment, yet the conflict can restart if Hamas’s weapons, the Israeli military presence and the future government of Gaza remain unresolved.
This is why Trump’s framework does not speak only of stopping fire. It attempts to connect disarmament, withdrawal, international security and Palestinian governance within a single process.
But this produces the hardest question: which step comes first?
What is the sequencing dilemma?
Hamas argues that disarming while the Israeli military remains present would amount to surrender. If it gives up its weapons first, it would have no practical leverage to enforce an Israeli withdrawal.
Israel argues the opposite. If it withdraws its troops first while Hamas retains rockets, explosives, underground tunnels and its command network, Gaza may again be used as a base for attacks.
The positions are therefore:
Hamas: Israeli withdrawal first, disarmament afterwards.
Israel: Verified disarmament first, withdrawal afterwards.
This may be described as a sequencing dilemma. Both actions are necessary, but neither party wants to become dependent on the other side’s goodwill after taking the first step.
A practical solution to the deadlock may be simultaneous and phased implementation. This does not mean that everything must happen on the same day. The two processes may instead be divided into small, measurable stages.
For example, Hamas may first surrender an identified category of weapons. Independent monitors would verify compliance. In return, Israel would withdraw troops from a specified zone. The next stage would involve further disarmament and further withdrawal.
Under such an arrangement, every action by one side would trigger a corresponding action by the other. This would be possible only if a neutral mechanism could determine whether both parties had genuinely fulfilled their commitments.
Why is it so difficult to verify disarmament?
The statement that “Hamas will give up its weapons” sounds simple, but disarmament on the ground would involve much more than depositing visible rifles and rockets.
The verifying authority would have to determine:
- Where hidden weapons and explosives are located;
- Whether underground tunnels have been dismantled;
- Whether rocket-production facilities have been closed;
- Whether the armed command structure has ended or merely gone underground;
- What arrangements will prevent fresh weapons smuggling;
- Whether other Palestinian armed groups are also complying with the agreement.
If Israel alone conducts verification, Hamas will not regard it as neutral. If Hamas declares its own compliance, Israel will not trust the declaration. Independent international monitoring therefore becomes a central element of the framework.
Even after weapons and tunnels are addressed, another question remains: what will happen to the armed fighters?
Value Addition: What is DDR?
Post-conflict settlements often use a DDR framework—Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.
Disarmament removes weapons.
Demobilisation formally dissolves armed units and their command structures.
Reintegration seeks to bring former fighters into civilian life, employment, education or lawful security institutions.
Suppose fighters surrender their weapons but receive no income, social acceptance or political future. They may create new armed groups or enter organised crime.
Sustainable peace therefore cannot be built through weapons collection alone. It must also address the future of former fighters and their reintegration into society.
If Hamas’s armed structure is dismantled and Israeli forces also withdraw gradually, a temporary security vacuum may arise between the two processes. The proposed International Stabilization Force and a new Palestinian police are intended to fill this vacuum.
Why would an International Stabilization Force be required?
A security vacuum is a condition in which the old military or governing authority has withdrawn, but a new authority has not yet become effective.
In such a situation, armed gangs, looting, revenge attacks, diversion of aid and internal clashes may increase. A temporary multinational force could therefore assist with law and order and ceasefire monitoring during the transition.
However, announcing such a force is not enough. It must be clarified:
- Which countries will participate;
- Who will exercise command;
- Whether the force will have a United Nations mandate;
- How it will operate between the Israeli military and Palestinian authorities;
- How long it will remain in Gaza;
- Under what circumstances it may use force.
These questions are answered through the force’s mandate and rules of engagement.
The mandate specifies the tasks for which the force has legal authority. The rules of engagement determine when, and to what extent, it may use force.
Even so, an international force cannot substitute permanently for governance. An external force may stabilise the transition, but routine policing must eventually be performed by a locally accepted Palestinian institution.
A new Palestinian police and civil government
A new Palestinian police would have to handle ordinary crimes, humanitarian routes, aid distribution, public gatherings and local disputes. Its credibility, however, would not arise from training and equipment alone.
If it is seen as a force imposed by external powers, the local population will not trust it. If fighters belonging to one political faction are absorbed into the police without screening, the police may become a new militia rather than a neutral institution.
Transparent recruitment, professional training, civilian control and judicial oversight would therefore be essential.
But the police can manage only law and order. Gaza also requires a civil administration for hospitals, schools, water supply, sanitation, food distribution and reconstruction.
This is where governance leads to the question of legitimacy. Creating an administration is not enough; Palestinians must regard it as lawful, representative and genuinely Palestinian.
If a government is Palestinian in name but external actors control its funding, security and policy decisions, it may be an effective administration without becoming legitimate self-government.
This makes the role of the Board of Peace useful but also controversial.
The Board of Peace and the question of sovereignty
The Board of Peace could assist with ceasefire monitoring, international funding, reconstruction and coordination among different actors.
Its actual powers must, however, be clearly defined. Will it only monitor commitments, or will it also approve decisions of the Palestinian government? Will reconstruction funds remain under its control? How much Palestinian representation will it contain? When will its mandate end?
If the Board functions as a temporary facilitator and gradually transfers authority to Palestinian institutions, it may help the transition.
But if it controls Gaza’s political decisions for a prolonged period, a sovereignty question will arise. Palestinians may view it as external administration rather than self-government.
Because Hamas and Israel do not trust each other’s guarantees, mediators such as Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye may act as bridges during the transition.
The role of Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye
Egypt is Gaza’s direct neighbour. The Rafah crossing, possible refugee movement and the security of Sinai give the Gaza conflict an immediate impact on Egypt.
Qatar has served as a communication channel between the Hamas leadership and Western governments. When the parties do not speak directly, a mediator carries messages, proposals and counter-proposals.
Türkiye is a politically active regional actor on the Palestinian question and maintains communication with Palestinian actors, including Hamas.
The mediators’ role may not be limited to arranging meetings. They may also have to contribute to guarantees relating to prisoner releases, humanitarian access, ceasefire violations and phased implementation.
Even an agreement between Hamas and Israel would not be sufficient if other armed groups remained outside the framework.
Why does Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s disagreement matter?
Hamas is the most prominent armed organisation in Gaza, but it is not the only one. Palestinian Islamic Jihad—PIJ—is also active there.
PIJ described reports about the agreement as inaccurate, indicating that all Palestinian armed groups may not share a common position.
If Hamas accepts disarmament but other groups retain weapons, Israel may argue that the security threat from Gaza has not ended. A rocket attack by even a smaller group could collapse the entire ceasefire.
A comprehensive disarmament framework must therefore address Hamas as well as other relevant armed actors.
Why should this not yet be treated as a final peace agreement?
Three distinct stages must be understood in the present situation.
Announcement: Trump has claimed that a historic agreement has been achieved.
Conditional response: Hamas has acknowledged the arrangement, but has attached the conditions of Israeli withdrawal and an end to the killing.
Ground implementation: Weapons surrender, troop withdrawal, deployment of the international force and establishment of a new Palestinian government have not yet been fully implemented.
In addition, Palestinian Islamic Jihad has questioned the reports and resistance is also visible within the Israeli political leadership.
It is therefore more accurate to describe the development as a conditional political-security framework rather than a final treaty.
Balanced conclusion
Permanent peace in Gaza cannot be created merely by stopping fire. Hamas’s disarmament, Israeli withdrawal, international verification, Palestinian policing and representative governance must all be implemented through inter-linked stages.
Removing Hamas’s weapons will not be sufficient without a credible arrangement for Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian political authority. Similarly, an Israeli withdrawal will not be sustainable if rockets, tunnels and armed networks remain intact.
Every party’s commitment must therefore be linked to a measurable action by the other. A clear roadmap is also required for reintegrating former fighters, carrying out humanitarian reconstruction and establishing a locally legitimate government.
Core takeaway: The greatest difficulty in Gaza is not the declaration of peace, but the crisis of trust and sequencing. Hamas needs assurance that Israeli withdrawal will follow disarmament. Israel needs assurance that Gaza will not again become a base for armed attacks after withdrawal. Until both guarantees are brought together in a single enforceable and independently verified process, the ceasefire cannot become permanent peace.
- Ceasefire
- A temporary or agreed cessation of active hostilities without necessarily resolving the underlying conflict.
- Peace agreement
- A broader political and security settlement addressing the causes and future management of a conflict.
- Sequencing dilemma
- A deadlock over which reciprocal obligation must be performed first.
- Credible commitment problem
- A situation in which parties cannot trust that the other side will honour a promise after gaining an advantage.
- Disarmament
- The collection, removal or destruction of weapons held by combatants.
- Demobilisation
- The formal dissolution of armed units and command structures.
- Reintegration
- The process of helping former fighters enter civilian, economic or lawful institutional life.
- Security vacuum
- A period in which old authority has withdrawn but effective replacement authority has not yet emerged.
- International Stabilization Force
- A temporary multinational force intended to support security, monitoring and transition after conflict.
- Mandate
- The legal authority and assigned functions of an institution or force.
- Rules of engagement
- Rules defining when and how a security force may use force.
- Verification regime
- An institutional system for confirming whether parties have complied with commitments.
- Post-conflict governance
- Institutions and arrangements for administering a territory after major violence ends.
- Political legitimacy
- Public and legal acceptance of an authority’s right to govern.
- Phased reciprocity
- A step-by-step process in which verified action by one side triggers corresponding action by the other.
“The central obstacle to peace in Gaza is not agreement on goals, but agreement on sequence and guarantees.” Discuss.
1. Decode the demand
The question requires the candidate to move beyond a descriptive account of the conflict and explain the credible-commitment problem: why disarmament, withdrawal, verification, transitional security and legitimate governance must be linked.
2. Introduction strategy
A ceasefire can stop immediate violence, but a durable peace settlement must resolve who disarms, who withdraws, who verifies compliance and who governs the territory after the transition. Gaza illustrates how a shared end-state can remain unreachable when the first mover fears irreversible vulnerability.
3. Body architecture
Context and core issue
State that Hamas seeks Israeli withdrawal before giving up weapons, while Israel demands verified disarmament before withdrawal. This creates a sequencing dilemma rooted in mutual distrust.
Security dimension
Explain rockets, tunnels, explosives, command networks, smuggling routes and the risk that a premature withdrawal could permit rearmament.
Verification dimension
Show why neither unilateral Israeli verification nor self-certified Hamas compliance will be accepted; independent monitoring and measurable benchmarks are essential.
Post-conflict dimension
Use DDR—Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration—to explain why weapons collection must be accompanied by dissolution of armed structures and civilian rehabilitation of fighters.
Governance dimension
Discuss the danger of a security vacuum, the possible role of an International Stabilization Force, a professional Palestinian police and a locally legitimate civil administration.
Sovereignty dimension
Examine whether the Board of Peace remains a temporary facilitator or becomes an externally controlled governing structure.
Regional mediation
Bring in Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye as channels for communication, guarantees, humanitarian access and phased compliance.
Way forward
Recommend reciprocal and phased implementation: every verified act of disarmament should trigger a corresponding withdrawal step, backed by neutral monitoring and a time-bound transfer to legitimate Palestinian institutions.
4. Suggested answer flow
For a 15-marker, keep the introduction and conclusion compact and devote most words to analytical dimensions and the way forward.
5. Domain vocabulary for value addition
“Gaza will move from ceasefire to peace only when both sides’ guarantees are embedded in one enforceable sequence. Peace cannot rest on trust alone; it must be designed so that compliance by one side automatically produces measurable compliance by the other.”